Letter, Joseph Stalin to Franklin Roosevelt, June 11, 1943. American forces went into action in North Africa in late 1942. But Stalin demanded his allies quickly establish a promised 'Second Front' in Northwest Europe to relieve the intense German pressure on the Soviet Union. In Spring 1943, FDR and Churchill decided they couldn't mount that invasion until 1944. Instead, they approved 1943 operations against Italy. Stalin expresses deep displeasure in this letter.

PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE

OF PREMIER J.V. STALIN TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

Your message in which you inform me about certain decisions on the questions of strategy made by you and Mr. Churchill I received on June 4. I thank you for the message.

As is apparent from your message, these decisions are in contradiction with those made by you and Mr. Churchill at the beginning of this year, regarding the terms of the opening of the second front in Western Europe.

You of course remember that in the joint message of January 26 of this year you and Mr. Churchill informed me about the decision made at that time to divert considerable German land and air forces from the Russian front and to force Germany on her knees in 1943.

Later Mr. Churchill on his own behalf informed me on February 12 about the more precise terms of the British-American operation in Tunisia and in Mediterranean, as well as on the Western coast of Europe. It was said in this message, that preparations for the operation of forcing the Channel in August 1943 were energetically being carried out by Great Britain and the United States, and should weather or other reasons have prevented it, then this operation would be prepared for September 1943 with participation of larger forces in it.
Now, in May, 1943 you and Mr. Churchill made the decision postponing the British-American invasion of Western Europe until spring of 1944. That is the opening of the second front in Western Europe which was postponed already from 1942 to 1943, is being postponed again, this time until spring 1944.

This decision creates exceptional difficulties for the Soviet Union, which has already been fighting for two years, with utmost strain of its strength, against the main forces of Germany and her satellites, and leaves the Soviet Army, fighting not only for its own country, but also for its Allies, to its own strength, almost in single combat with yet very strong and dangerous enemy.

Is it necessary to say what painful and negative impression will be made in the Soviet Union, upon its people and its Army, by the new postponement of the second front, and by leaving our Army, which has made so many sacrifices, without expected serious support from the British-American Armies?

As to the Soviet Government, it does not find it possible to agree with this decision, made, besides, without its participation and without attempt to discuss jointly this most important question, and which decision may result in grave consequences for the future progress of the war.